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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4165 
 ___________ 
 
 DJAMKHUR T. VAHIDOV, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A089-082-819) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2012 
 
 Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed May 23, 2012) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Djamkhur Vahidov, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals‟s (“BIA”) October 19, 2011 order denying his motion to remand.  
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For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
 In 2008, Vahidov appeared in removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”), who ordered Vahidov removed to his native Uzbekistan and denied his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture.  The BIA denied Vahidov‟s subsequent appeal.  Vahidov filed a petition 
for review; we denied the petition to the extent that Vahidov challenged the agency‟s 
resolution of his requests for asylum and related relief, but we granted the petition in part 
because the BIA failed to adjudicate Vahidov‟s motion to remand, which was 
incorporated into his brief before the BIA.  See Vahidov v. Att‟y Gen., 413 F. App‟x 462, 
465-66 (3d Cir. 2011).  The motion to remand, which comprised a single paragraph in his 
brief, contended that the case should be remanded to the IJ to consider whether Vahidov 
has a well-founded fear of persecution based on his status as an asylum applicant in the 
United States.  Notably, Vahidov did not raise that claim before the IJ, and his motion 
relied only on the 2007 State Department Country Report on Uzbekistan, which indicates 
that the Uzbekistani government pressured certain other countries to return individuals 
who had sought asylum, and Lin v. United States Dep‟t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 
2006), both of which were available during the proceedings before the IJ. 
 On remand, the BIA held that Vahidov‟s claim for asylum based on his status as 
an asylum applicant was waived and, in the alternative, that he had failed to meet his 
burden of demonstrating that a remand was warranted.  Accordingly, the BIA denied the 
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motion to remand.  Vahidov then filed a petition for review. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the BIA‟s denial 
of a motion to remand or to reopen for abuse of discretion, see Huang v. Att‟y Gen., 620 
F.3d 372, 390 (3d Cir. 2010), and will not disturb that decision unless it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal citation omitted).  “The BIA treats a motion to remand for the purpose of 
submitting additional evidence in the same manner as motions to reopen the record.”  
Huang, 620 F.3d at 389.  Accordingly, the BIA may deny the motion if:  “(1) the alien as 
not established a prima facie case for the relief sought; (2) the alien „has not introduced 
previously unavailable, material evidence‟; or (3) in the case of discretionary relief (such 
as asylum), the alien would not be entitled to relief even if the motion was granted.”  
Caushi v. Att‟y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 
94, 104 (1988)).   
 In denying Vahidov‟s motion to remand, the BIA reasoned that Vahidov‟s new 
asylum claim was waived and, in the alternative, that even if the new claim was not 
waived, he would not be entitled to relief if the matter were remanded to the IJ.  We need 
not address the BIA‟s waiver analysis because we agree with the alternative holding that 
Vahidov‟s motion lacked merit.   
 To demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a fear of future persecution, an 
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applicant must demonstrate that he “has a genuine fear, and that a reasonable person in 
[his] circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [his] native country.”  
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003).  To satisfy the objective 
prong, a petitioner must show that he would be individually singled out for persecution or 
demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated individuals.  See Lie 
v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, the BIA first concluded that the 
Country Report Vahidov relied on did not demonstrate that Uzbekistan persecutes 
individuals who seek asylum in the United States.  We agree.  As the BIA noted, 
although the Country Report indicates that Uzbekistan aggressively sought the return of 
certain Uzbekistani refugees living in Russia, these refugees were, for the most part, 
believed to have been involved in terrorist or anti-government activities, i.e., the 2005 
events in Andijon, see AR 116-17, and there is no evidence in the Country Report that 
asylum seekers are persecuted upon returning to Uzbekistan on the basis of having sought 
asylum. 
 Likewise, we agree with the BIA that Vahidov‟s reliance on Lin v. United States 
Dep‟t of Justice is inapposite.  In Lin, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that 
the petitioner may have faced a new risk of persecution when the United States 
government inadvertently notified Chinese authorities of the petitioner‟s asylum 
application; accordingly, a remand was warranted for the agency to consider that claim.  
See 495 F.3d at 267-68.  As the BIA reasoned, Vahidov failed to demonstrate that any 
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such circumstances exist in his case, as there is no evidence in the record that officials in 
the United States have alerted the Uzbekistani government to his asylum application. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
